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SOVEREIGN DEBT SYMPOSIUM
Sovereign Debt Restructuring – In the
Machine Room of Legal Engineering
The authors and editors of the special issue on sovereign debt restructuring are highly
grateful to the contributors to this symposium on sovereign debt for their thought-
provoking contributions. As I have highlighted in my initial post, this special issue is as
much about improving the current practice of sovereign debt restructuring as it is about
legal engineering – in this case, about instigating incremental progressive development in
a crucial policy area that requires international coordination, but is not very likely to see
the timely adoption of an international treaty. The contributors raised too many issues to
answer them all in a brief concluding post, and I admit that some of them deserve further
thought. Instead of going through them one by one, I will focus on a few methodological
issues in the following lines, which might also be of interest to those outside the small
but rewarding field of sovereign debt.
Principles as the right type of norms?
The incremental approach taps the potential of legal scholarship for the progressive
development of international law. This is nothing new – most of the fundamental
concepts of the discipline originate in the works of legal scholars who distilled them from
practice. Ideally, that requires scholarship to remain at equidistance from the Scylla and
Charybdis of apology and utopia, as Ntina Tzouvala rightly observes. But our proposal for
improving sovereign debt restructurings advocates to focus on principles, the most
abstract types of legal concepts.  This, argues Ntina, bears the risk of remaining overly
general, lacking the granularity to address the specifics of each debt restructuring.
I agree with Ntina that such a risk exists and that it might compromise the effectiveness
of the incremental approach. Nevertheless, principles might be advantageous for two
reasons. First, the regulation of economic issues is fraught with uncertainty. General
rules leave ample room to address developments that were not, and could not be,
foreseen. It is perhaps better not to introduce strict rules like the now-ominous no-
bailout rule in Art. 125 TFEU which crumble away at the first real test. Instead, principles
set out a road for negotiations, for a structured decision-making process, without
determining the exact coordinates of that road as it winds through changing territory.
Second, there is always the possibility that such broad principles develop and concretize
as more and more roads begin to pervade the landscape, facilitating orientation.
Domestic legislation and case law are the means to such concretization. This applies in
particular to human rights. It is true, as Ntina recalls, that the rise of human rights has
coincided with their virtual absence in the field of sovereign debt restructuring. But
things do not need to remain like this. If conditionality follows a market logic that too

often than not prevails over social considerations, then bringing human rights into the
equation might change the dynamics of the whole debate about conditionalities and lead
towards greater concretization of human rights obligations in times of sovereign debt
crisis.
Underreach and Overreach
However, international law principles might not reach each actor with a crucial role to
play in sovereign debt restructurings. Régis Bismuth has reminded us of the large variety
of actors who seem to stand in the second line, but might actually take decisions of huge
significance for the entire debt restructuring process, such as the Financial Stability
Board, credit rating agencies, and IOSCO. It seems bold to claim that their behavior can
be regulated by principles of international law, as this might raise intricate questions of
the responsibility of private and hybrid actors under international law. However, if the
incremental approach is helpful in popularizing certain accepted standards, for example
for the measurement of sovereign debt sustainability, reputational and market reasons
might induce compliance by actors who are not strictly bound by such standards.
The opposite problem would consist in unintended consequences that overreach and
create difficulties in other areas of international law. Régis cautions about the impact of
the incremental approach on sovereign immunities, highlighting a case from France.
While the UNCTAD Roadmap did not put particular emphasis on immunities, it is indeed
a theoretical possibility that unintended consequences might arise for international law
more generally, so the issue deserves closer study in the frame of a project aiming at legal
reform. For example, it would be detrimental to international law if the skepticism about
holdout litigation led to a general rollback of international dispute settlement. In this
respect, the solution adopted for CETA, which exempts holdout litigation from the
jurisdiction of the investment court, appears highly promising.
The perks and jerks of inductive reasoning
Principles in international law, whether general principles of law in the narrow sense or
principles in the wider sense, rely on inductive reasoning from domestic or international
law. Vassilis Paliouras usefully reminds us of the limits of quasi-analogical inductions
from domestic law. Inter-creditor equity cannot mean the same with respect to
sovereign debt as in the context of domestic bankruptcies. The gargantuan nature of
modern sovereign debt crises, their tendency to spread across borders and sectors, and
the fact that the state and other public actors work in the public interest, and cannot
therefore be liquidated, all deserve to be kept in mind. For this reason, the proposed
principles mainly take inspiration from the development of sovereign debt restructuring
practice and its increasing focus on public interest, rather than domestic bankruptcy law.
Like Vassilis, Mauro Megliani cautions us against overly optimistic analogies, in this case
good faith. He points out the scarcity of precedent where courts quashed holdout
litigation because it violated good faith. There is no point in beating about the bush in
that respect. However, the principal reason why I believe that good faith has a role to play
is, as Mauro concedes, the emergence of sovereign debt sustainability as a principle. So
why not invoke the latter principle as a bar to holdout litigation? While that would be a
possibility, I believe there are certain advantages to good faith. Sovereign debt
sustainability does not specify a procedure or a behavioral standard for confronting
sovereign debt litigation. By contrast, a wealth of experience and precedents related to
largely similar situations is stored in the principle of good faith. By extending the
principle of good faith accordingly, one might deploy this rich resource for sovereign
debt restructurings.
This, however, has already led me to the depth of the machine room of legal engineering.
Unlike real engineering, it does not resemble a mechanical process. Quite to the
opposite, it requires a profound understanding of human behavior, political relationships,
and law and economics in the field of sovereign debt restructurings. I am grateful to the
contributors for broadening my understanding in these respects.
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